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“Executive Privilege and Congressional Oversight”
House Committee on the Judiciary
Wednesday, May 15, 2019

Testimony of Kate Shaw
Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

Chairman Nadler, Ranking Member Collins, and Distinguished Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege.
My name is Kate Shaw, and I am a Professor of Law at Cardozo Law School, where my work
focuses, among other things, on executive power and questions of constitutionalism outside the
courts. Before I began teaching, I worked as an Associate Counsel in the Obama White House
Counsel’s Office, from 2009–2011.
I understand that the purpose of today’s hearing is to contextualize and assess the White House’s
recent “protective” assertion of executive privilege over the entirety of the unredacted “Report on
the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election,” prepared by Special
Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III, and underlying materials sought by this Committee, as well as the
ongoing exchanges between this Committee and the executive branch regarding requests for
documents and testimony from former White House Counsel Donald McGahn. Accordingly, my
testimony will offer some brief background on executive privilege, both generally and in the context
of Congress’s exercise of its oversight authority. It will then address more specifically the legal
questions presented by recent events involving Committee requests for documents and testimony,
subpoenas, and the formal assertion (and the more informal suggestions) of executive privilege.
In this statement, I will draw on legal authority from both courts and the political branches. As a
general matter, the judicial authority in this area is sparse. That’s no accident: historically, the
overwhelming majority of disputes between Congress and the President over access to information
have been resolved internally, within the political branches. So, while I will address the handful of
court cases that grapple with the contours of executive privilege, and the subset of those that arose
in the context of congressional requests for information, I think equally important is the extrajudicial history—the principles and practices that for decades have guided the political branches in
their approach to executive privilege.
In brief, the history I canvass here makes clear that blanket invocations of the privilege over wide
swaths of executive-branch material are without substantial support in either case law or executivebranch practice; moreover, they are unsupported by the principles that underlie the privilege. That
1

said, as to many of the individual documents at issue, there may be viable claims of privilege; if the
executive-branch wishes to achieve a resolution that allows it to protect individual communications
without risking erosion of the privilege in court, it would be well-advised to reconsider its approach
in favor of one that better comports with long-standing practice.
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
The Nature & Scope of Executive Privilege
The term “executive privilege” does not appear in the Constitution. But the power to withhold
certain information from the courts and Congress is today broadly understood as an important, if
bounded, privilege enjoyed by the president. The Supreme Court confirmed the existence of a
constitutionally grounded executive privilege in United States v. Nixon, where it found that some form
of executive privilege was both “fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.” 1 But the Nixon Court also held that
“neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level
communications” could “sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from
judicial process under all circumstances.” 2
The executive privilege identified in Nixon, then, was presumptive and qualified, not absolute. And
the Court went on to reject President Nixon’s assertion that the privilege shielded him from
compelled production of tapes and documents sought by the Watergate Special Prosecutor. 3
Nixon remains the single most important case on the nature and scope of executive privilege, but it
left many questions unanswered. In the years since Nixon, the D.C. Circuit has decided several
significant cases that create additional executive-privilege doctrine. First, in In re Sealed Case (Espy), 4 a
case involving an Office of Independent Counsel investigation into Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy,
the D.C. Circuit identified several distinct strains of executive privilege: first, a deliberative process
privilege; and second, a privilege that attached to presidential communications. As to both, the court
held that when evaluating a claim of privilege, “courts must balance the public interests at stake in
determining whether the privilege should yield in a particular case, and must specifically consider the
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974). Although the first formal judicial recognition of executive privilege
did not appear until 1974, presidents since Washington have been asserting the prerogative to withhold some
communications from both Congress and the courts. Some suggest that judicial recognition of executive privilege is
traceable to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), where in addition to announcing the
power of judicial review, Chief Justice Marshall also suggested a need for courts to avoid “intrud[ing] into the cabinet,
and intermeddl[ing] with the prerogatives of the executive.” See also MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: THE
DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 37–38 (1994) (discussing President Jefferson’s attempts to
keep from Congress certain documents related to Aaron Burr’s involvement in a secessionist conspiracy).
2 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706.
3 Id. at 713.
4 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
1
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need of the party seeking privileged evidence.” 5 Applying that balancing, the court found that the
Independent Counsel had made out a sufficiently strong showing to overcome the presidential
communications privilege as to some of the requested documents. 6
In 2004, the D.C. Circuit decided Judicial Watch v. Department of Justice, a case involving a FOIA
request for DOJ documents in the offices of the Pardon Attorney and the Deputy Attorney
General. Describing the case as “call[ing] upon the court to strike a balance between the twin values
of transparency and accountability of the executive branch on the one hand, and on the other hand,
protection of the confidentiality of Presidential decision-making and the President’s ability to obtain
candid, informed advice,” 7 the court rejected the invitation to extend the presidential
communications privilege identified in Espy to encompass documents created outside of the White
House and that “never make their way to the Office of the President.” 8 In both of these D.C.
Circuit cases, then, presidents have been unsuccessful in their attempts to expand the scope of the
judicially recognized privilege for presidential communications.

Executive Privilege and Congressional Oversight
Nixon involved a grand jury subpoena, and much of the Court’s discussion was grounded in, and at
times expressly limited to, the criminal context; Espy arose in the context of an Independent Counsel
investigation; Judicial Watch involved FOIA litigation. So none of these cases addressed clashes
between claims of executive privilege and requests for information in the context of congressional
oversight. 9
Like executive privilege, Congress’s oversight power is nowhere to be found in the text of the
Constitution. But like executive privilege, its existence today is beyond serious dispute—an accepted
extension of, and incident to, Congress’s enumerated powers. The Supreme Court made explicit in
the 1927 case McGrain v. Daugherty that the “power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.” 10 The McGrain Court continued: “the
houses of Congress have the power, through their own processes, to compel a private individual to
appear before it or one of its committees and give testimony needed to enable it efficiently to
exercise a legislative function belonging to it under the constitution.” 11 Later cases have elaborated
Id. at 746.
Id. at 761–62.
7 Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
8 Id. at 1116–17.
9 Indeed, Nixon itself was noncommittal about its applicability to congressional oversight, United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 712 n.19 (1974) (“We are not here concerned with the balance between the President's generalized interest in
confidentiality and . . . congressional demands for information.”).
10 273 U.S. at 177. As with Nixon and executive privilege, McGrain in many ways merely represented judicial confirmation
of a practice the political branches had long understood to have constitutional foundations.
11 Id. at 160.
5
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on the mechanics of this function, explaining that the “[i]ssuance of subpoenas” is “a legitimate use
by Congress of its power to investigate.” 12
The Court has also identified prerequisites to the exercise of the power of inquiry, explaining that
congressional investigation must be “related to and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the
Congress.” 13 So long as these prerequisites are satisfied, however, the power of inquiry is broad:
“The scope of the power of inquiry, in short, is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential
power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.” 14
Only a handful of cases directly address congressional requests for executive-branch information. In
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, the D.C. Circuit declined to enforce a
Senate committee subpoena for the tapes that would eventually be obtained by the Watergate
Special Prosecutor; pointing to the House Judiciary Committee’s presidential impeachment inquiry,
the court held that “the Select Committee’s immediate oversight need for the subpoenaed tapes is,
from a congressional perspective, merely cumulative. Against the claim of privilege, the only
oversight interest that the Select Committee can currently assert is that of having these particular
conversations scrutinized simultaneously by two committees.” 15
Two relatively recent district court opinions address congressional demands for information and
executive resistance to those demands. In Committee on Judiciary v. Miers, a case involving a subpoena
for testimony from White House officials in conjunction with an investigation into the firing of nine
U.S. Attorneys, the district court “reject[ed] the Executive’s claim of absolute immunity for senior
presidential aides.” 16 And Committee on Oversight and Government Reform v. Holder, while not addressing
the merits of the dispute over access to documents sought as part of a committee investigation into
the “Fast and Furious” firearm purchase and transfer operation, firmly rejected the Department of
Justice’s argument that “because the executive is seeking to shield records from the legislature,
another co-equal political body, the law forbids the Court from getting involved.” 17
In both of these recent disputes, then, the executive branch pressed in the courts expansive notions
of the scope or unreviewability of executive privilege, and in both instances it was unsuccessful. But
the congressional victories came too late for meaningful oversight of the presidencies at issue;
accordingly, while generally reinforcing legislative authority, these cases are viewed by some scholars
as cautionary tales about the limits of courts’ ability to resolve legislative oversight disputes.
POLITICAL-BRANCH PRACTICE AND AUTHORITY
Eastland v. U. S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975).
Id. at 505.
14 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959).
15 Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
16 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 99 (D.D.C. 2008).
17 Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2013).
12
13
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The cases discussed above represent the key judicial authority on these questions. But this limited
judicial authority does not mean there is no other legal authority on the contours of congressional
entitlement to information from the executive branch. 18 Indeed, a rich body of executive-branch
legal authority reflects a strong vision of executive power to protect information from disclosure,
but also appears to accept the legitimacy of Congress’s constitutional entitlement to access some
executive-branch information. 19 These writings also set forth a cooperative vision of information
exchange that should provide a roadmap for the next steps in the present dispute.
Not surprisingly, Memoranda from the Office of Legal Counsel and opinions or letters by senior
executive-branch officials describe a strong executive privilege. For one thing, they identify
categories of privileged information beyond the “presidential communications privilege” and
“deliberative process privilege” endorsed by the D.C. Circuit. A 1989 opinion by then-Assistant
Attorney General William Barr, for example, describes three categories of executive privilege: “state
secrets, law enforcement, and deliberative process.” 20
These executive-branch writings, however, also appear to accept the principle that under some
circumstances, Congress has a legitimate entitlement to executive-branch information. As Attorney
General William French Smith wrote in 1981, “In cases in which the Congress has a legitimate need
for information that will help it legislate and the Executive Branch has a legitimate, constitutionally
recognized need to keep information confidential, the courts have referred to the obligation of each
Branch to accommodate the legitimate needs of the other . . . The accommodation required is not
simply an exchange of concessions or a test of political strength. It is an obligation of each Branch
to make a principled effort to acknowledge, and if possible to meet, the legitimate needs of the other
Branch.” 21 A Memorandum issued by President Ronald Reagan explained that “The policy of this
Administration is to comply with Congressional requests for information to the fullest extent
consistent with the constitutional and statutory obligations of the executive branch….executive
privilege will be asserted only in the most compelling circumstances, and only after careful review
demonstrates that the assertion of privilege is necessary.” 22 And in 2000, OLA head Robert Raben
reiterated that basic position: “In implementing the longstanding policy of the Executive Branch
JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION 14 (2017) (“[A]t its heart, the American constitutional separation of
powers focuses on the creation of…conflict between branches of government without an overarching adjudicator to
resolve the conflict in principled, binding, and lasting way.”).
19 Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489, 496 (2007) (“Beginning
with the Eisenhower administration, some Presidents have articulated explicit policies on executive privilege through
letters, public statements, and memoranda”).
20 Cong. Requests for Confidential Exec. Branch Info., 13 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 153, 154 (1989). See also
Memorandum for the Attorney General Re: Confidentiality of the Attorney General’s Communications in Counseling
the President, 6 Op. O.L.C. 481, 484-90 (1982).
21 43 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 327, 332 (1981).
22 Memorandum from President Ronald Reagan for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Re: Procedures
Governing Responses to Congressional Requests for Information (Nov. 4, 1982),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3864882-1982-Reagan-Memo-re-procedures-governing.html.
18
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to comply with Congressional requests for information to the fullest extent consistent with the
constitutional and statutory obligations of the Executive Branch, the Department’s goal in all cases
is to satisfy legitimate legislative interests while protecting Executive Branch
confidentiality interests.” 23
Authority from Congress, not surprisingly, centers on congressional prerogatives and entitlement to
information from the executive branch; but it too recognizes the legitimacy of some form of
executive privilege. 24 An oversight manual produced by the Congressional Research Service, for
example, explains that “while the congressional power of inquiry is broad, it is not unlimited. . . . the
power to investigate may be exercised only ‘in aid of the legislative function’ and cannot be used to
expose for the sake of exposure alone.” 25 The same report acknowledges that executive privilege is
“a doctrine which, like Congress’ powers to investigate and cite for contempt, has constitutional
roots.” 26 Another CRS report approvingly cites a judicial statement that “the Framers relied ‘on the
expectation that where conflicts in scope of authority arose between the coordinate branches, a
spirit of dynamic compromise would promote resolution of the dispute in the manner most likely to
result in efficient and effective functioning of our governmental system.’” 27
What forms have these methods of compromise and accommodation taken over the years? At times
congressional committees have narrowed requests, and the executive branch has provided
documents pursuant to more narrowly drawn requests. On other occasions, the executive has given
access to sensitive documents to a subset of committee members and staff, or has provided
summaries rather than documents themselves, or access but not the ability to retain documents.
Sometimes these processes are protracted. Professor Peter Shane describes several episodes in the
1980s; each began with “initial informal demand, negotiation, subpoena, further negotiation, a
subcommittee vote, further negotiation, a committee vote,” and in one instance “further negotiation,
a House vote, and still further negotiation.” 28 And in general executive privilege assertions are rare,
carefully considered, and made only after genuine attempts at pursuing available alternatives.

Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Att’y Gen., to John Linder, House Subcomm. on Rules & Org. of the House 2–3
(Jan. 27, 2000). See also Andrew McCanse Wright, Constitutional Conflict and Congressional Oversight, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 881,
922–23 (2014).
24 MORTON ROSENBERG CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY (1995).
25 Id. at 2 (quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880)).
26 Id. at 14.
27 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS: ENFORCING EXECUTIVE-BRANCH COMPLIANCE 1 n. 7 (Mar.
27, 2019) (quoting United States v. AT&T Co., 567 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
28 Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against
Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461, 515 (1987). See also Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A
Modest Proposal--Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 125 (1996) (“Rather than having the executive unconditionally turn
over all requested information to Congress or having the Congress withdraw its request for information altogether,
information access disputes are typically worked out through one of several intermediate options”).
23
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This history of compromise and mutual accommodation is relevant in itself; these practices structure
and order the legal obligations by which actors within the political branches understand themselves
to be bound. It is additionally relevant because courts are particularly attentive to past practice when
they render decisions in separation-of-powers disputes. Justice Frankfurter’s famous concurring
opinion in Youngstown explained that “It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American
constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life
has written upon them,” 29 and courts today routinely invoke practice between and among the
branches in separation-of-powers cases. 30
LIMITS ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
As the materials discussed above suggest, the proper balance between congressional need for
information and executive-branch confidentiality interests is highly contextual and fact-specific. So it
is somewhat hazardous to offer any categorical pronouncements in this sphere. But three broad
principles that relate to limits on executive privilege merit brief discussion: the impact of allegations
of misconduct on the availability of the privilege; the operation of waiver when it comes to executive
privilege; and the need for a nexus between communications subject to a privilege (at least the
presidential communications privilege), the performance of some legitimate presidential function,
and presidential duty.
Misconduct
Some courts have held that allegations of misconduct erode if not vitiate at least some forms of
executive privilege. The Espy court directly addressed this issue, dividing its misconduct analysis
between the two forms of privilege it identified. The deliberative process privilege, the court held,
“disappears altogether when there is any reason to believe government misconduct occurred.” 31 The
court found that the presidential communications privilege, a stronger privilege, did not disappear
on a suggestion of official misconduct; rather, a “party seeking to overcome the presidential privilege
seemingly must always provide a focused demonstration of need, even when there are allegations of
misconduct by high-level officials …” 32 Presumably, however, in the face of such a showing of need,
allegations of misconduct would tilt the balance strongly in favor of the congressional requester. 33
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 524 (2014) (stating that because the Recess Appointments Clause concerns the
separation of elected powers, “in interpreting the Clause, we put significant weight upon historical practice” (emphasis
omitted)). For discussions of “gloss” analysis, see generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power,
Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097 (2013); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W.
Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV L. REV. 411, 479 (2012).
31 In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
32 Id.
33 See also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 520 F. Supp. 414, 419 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (in case involving subpoena issued
in civil litigation, describing the “duty of a court …to balance the competing interests of the parties with respect to the
release of the disputed information,” and identifying “the public interest in the proper functioning of its governmental
29
30
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Several district court cases have followed Espy. In one case, the district court held that “as a legal
matter . . . the deliberative process privilege does not apply if there is a discrete factual basis for the
belief that ‘the deliberative information sought may shed light on government misconduct.’” 34 The
court continued: “if there is ‘any reason’ to believe the information sought may shed light on
government misconduct, public policy (as embodied by the law) demands that the misconduct not
be shielded merely because it happens to be predecisional and deliberative.” 35 And courts in two
FOIA cases have addressed the impact of alleged misconduct on attempts to withhold deliberative
material. In one, the court held that the deliberative process privilege did not apply to memoranda
that demonstrated that the Nixon White House considered using the IRS “in a selective and
discriminatory fashion” because the memoranda were “no more part of the legitimate governmental
process intended to be protected by [FOIA] Exemption 5 than would be memoranda discussing the
possibility of using a government agency to deliberately harass an opposition political party.” 36 In the
second, the court held that the misconduct exception did not apply, cautioning that “[i]f every hint
of marginal misconduct sufficed to erase the privilege, the exception would swallow the rule,” and
explaining that “[i]n the rare cases that have actually applied the exception, the ‘policy discussions’
sought to be protected with the deliberative process privilege were so out of bounds that merely
discussing them was evidence of a serious breach of the responsibilities of representative
government.” 37
Executive branch practice generally takes a broader view of the power of credible allegations of
misconduct to vitiate claims of privilege. As a general matter, lawyers within the executive branch
have historically operated within a strong culture in which documents that reveal governmental
misconduct are not viewed as candidates for a potential assertion of executive privilege.
So what must “misconduct” consist of in order to pierce the privilege? And how much of a
threshold showing of misconduct should be required to undermine a claim of privilege? Neither
courts nor executive-branch practice have made this clear; but it is unlikely that the “misconduct”
would need to be chargeable criminal conduct, or the privilege could function as a shield to conceal
wrongdoing and evade accountability.
Waiver
Any privilege can be waived. The D.C. Circuit in Espy made clear that “release of a document . . .
waives these privileges for the document or information specifically released,” 38 but declined to go
agencies” in a case in which “the DOE has been accused … of mismanaging a billion dollar governmental program that
has far-reaching effects on the American public.”).
34 Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 154, 164 (D.D.C. 1999).
35 Id.
36 Tax Reform Research Group v. IRS, 419 F. Supp. 415, 426 (D.D.C. 1976).
37 ICM Registry, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 538 F. Supp. 2d 130, 133 (D.D.C. 2008).
38 In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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further—that is, to find that the executive privilege, like the attorney-client privilege, would be
deemed waived whenever documents were disclosed to third parties. Waiver in the context of
executive privilege, then, is subject to a fact-intensive inquiry, which I discus further below.
Nexus to Presidential Function / Presidential Duty
Finally, there is some authority suggesting that in order to qualify for the privilege (at least the
presidential communications privilege), the communications at issue must have some nexus to the
performance of some presidential function, and must be consistent with presidential duty.
The D.C. Circuit, in both Espy and Judicial Watch, emphasized that the purpose of protecting
presidential communications is to “ensure that the President would receive full and frank advice
with regard to . . . non-delegable . . . power[s]” 39--appointment and removal in Espy; the pardon
power in Judicial Watch. These are core Article II powers, of course, and thus must be discharged
consistent with Article II’s Oath and Take Care clauses. 40 So there is an argument, rooted in Article
II, that the privilege cannot be used to shield from disclosure communications that do not have a
nexus to core presidential functions, or that reveal bad-faith or corrupt exercises of presidential
power, or conduct inconsistent with the President’s obligations. 41
CURRENT DISPUTES OVER SPECIAL COUNSEL REPORT, RELATED DOCUMENTS, AND
MCGAHN DOCUMENTS AND TESTIMONY
Turning to the present disputes between the Committee and the executive branch, I will make
several points related to what I understand to be the respective actions and positions taken over the
course of this inquiry.
“Protective” Privilege Assertion over Mueller Report and Related Documents
The sequence of events set forth in the Committee Report 42 suggests that the executive branch
response to the Committee has not been consistent with the practices and principles laid out above.
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
U.S. CONST. art II § 3, 1.
41 See Andrew Kent, Ethan Leib, & Jed Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3260593 (arguing that the President’s duty of “faithful
execution” requires the President to be “true, honest, diligent, due, skillful, careful, good faith, and impartial” in
execution of law, and to avoid self-dealing and other self-interested conduct.).
42 I should note here that I have no independent knowledge of these events, so my comments are based on the facts as
laid out in the report, as well as the exchange of letters between the Committee and the executive branch. H. COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., COMMITTEE REPORT FOR RESOLUTION RECOMMENDING THAT THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES FIND WILLIAM P. BARR, ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, IN CONTEMPT OF
CONGRESS FOR REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH A SUBPOENA DULY ISSUED BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
(Comm. Print 2019), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20190508/109451/HRPT-116ResolutionRecommendingthattheHouseofRepresentativesFindWilliamPBarrAttorneyGeneralU.pdf.
39
40
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Here it seems critical to distinguish between document-specific invocations of the privilege, which may
well be legitimate, and the sorts of categorical invocations that the administration has sought to
make, which are without substantial support in either case law or executive-branch practice. The
facts suggest that the executive branch’s approach to the documents sought by the Committee has
not involved careful analysis of individual documents and categories of documents, conducted
against a background of acceptance of the Committee’s legitimate oversight authority, but rather
rests on a strategy to deny the Committee any access at all.
This course of conduct is reflected in the “protective” assertion of executive privilege over all of the
subpoenaed materials, communicated to the Committee via letter from Assistant Attorney General
Stephen Boyd. 43
For several reasons, this assertion is untenable. First, the vast majority of the Mueller Report is
already in the public domain, so it is no longer subject to a potential privilege assertion—that it, the
privilege has been waived as to those public portions of the document.
Second, the White House has not identified what particular strains of executive privilege might
attach to individual portions of the still-redacted portions of the report, or non-public underlying
materials; some, like personal privacy and ongoing investigations, have at best shaky support in the
case law, even if executive-branch practice is generally to avoid public disclosure. And, as discussed
above, where some of the documents at issue involve documented allegations of misconduct, this
should minimize the President’s legitimate Article II interest in protecting them, and increase
congressional authority to obtain them.
Third, the Department of Justice rests its protective assertion of executive privilege on a 1996
opinion by then-Attorney General Janet Reno. But that opinion involved facts quite different from
those at issue here. First, all of the documents at issue were (a) White House documents that were
(b) indisputably predecisional and deliberative, primarily involving legal analysis prepared by White
House lawyers in response to ongoing investigations by Independent Counsel Ken Starr. Second,
none of the materials sought by Congress had been made public. 44
That said, one of the categories of information presently sought by the Committee appears so broad
as to put the executive-branch officials to a nearly impossible task. The third item on the
Committee’s subpoena consists of “All documents obtained and investigative materials created by
the Special Counsel’s Office.” 45 We know from the Special Counsel’s Report that the investigation
involved more than 2,800 subpoenas, 500 warrants, 230 communications records orders, and over
Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Jerrold Nadler, Chairman of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 116th Cong. (May 8, 2019), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/5993531/5-8-19-Boyd-LetterNadler.pdf.
44 Assertion of Executive Privilege Regarding White House Counsel’s Office Documents, 20 Op. O.L.C. (1996).
45 Subpoena to the Honorable William P. Barr (April 18, 2019),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/5993566/1-4-KgVnkxM9Muaz7AAKgh3w.pdf.
43
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500 witnesses. 46 In light of this volume, the Committee cannot in good faith expect compliance;
accordingly, the burden is on the Committee to substantially narrow this aspect of its request.
The Committee appears to believe that the executive branch has essentially withdrawn from the
process of negotiation, 47 providing affirmative authorization for Congress to do the same by moving
quickly to a subpoena and then contempt vote. These developments do not, however, relieve the
Committee of its obligation to continue to negotiate—to frame requests with specificity and care,
and where possible narrowly—both to potentially achieve some sort of resolution outside the
courts, and to allow the courts to adjudicate a narrow dispute if and when one party invokes their
jurisdiction.
Documents and Testimony from Former White House Counsel Donald McGahn
The White House has suggested that the documents sought by the Committee from former White
House Counsel Don McGahn “implicate significant Executive Branch confidentiality interests and
executive privilege,” 48 but to my knowledge has not moved to formally invoke executive privilege.
For at least three reasons, the White House lacks a strong foundation for an assertion of executive
privilege over all of the documents in the possession of former WH Counsel McGahn. First, the
White House did not assert any privilege with respect to McGahn’s provision of information to the
Special Counsel’s Office, nor did it object on the basis of privilege to the release of the largely
unredacted report. This may not constitute a waiver as to all of the documents in McGahn’s
possession, but as to those materials that were incorporated into the now-public report, there is no
longer any strong claim of privilege.
Second, the President has made numerous public statements, as recently as this week, to put before
the public his version of his conversations with Don McGahn. On April 25, the President tweeted
that he “never told the White House Counsel Don McGahn to fire Robert Mueller.” 49 On May 11,
he tweeted that “I was NOT going to fire Bob Mueller, and did not fire Bob Mueller. In fact, he
was allowed to finish his Report with unprecedented help from the Trump Administration.
Actually, lawyer Don McGahn had a much better chance of being fired than Mueller. Never a

1 SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN
THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 13 (2019), https://gamescdn.washingtonpost.com/notes/prod/default/documents/f5fe536c-81bb-45be-86e5-a9fee9794664/note/a8d336efe98d-4a08-987d-b4c154b22700.pdf.
47 Charlie Savage, Trump Vows Stonewall of “All” House Subpoenas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2019.
48 Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, to Jerrold Nadler, Chairman of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 116th Cong. (May 7, 2019), https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/812-cipollone-lettermcgahn/6500f55136eae0eebaf3/optimized/full.pdf.
49 Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter (April 25, 2019, 4:47 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1121380133137461248.
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big fan!” 50 Although there is no direct judicial authority on the impact of such statements on a
privilege claim, there is some analogous authority: courts’ treatment of public statements in the
context of FOIA litigation in which the government attempts to shield certain information from
disclosure. One such case involved a request for CIA records on the use of drones in targeted
killings. The CIA provided a “Glomar” response,” in which an agency refuses to confirm or deny
the existence of responsive records on the grounds of national security. The D.C. Circuit held
that statements by the President and other executive-branch officials effectively confirmed the
existence of a drone program, such that the CIA could not invoke Glomar. 51 And the Second Circuit
reached a similar conclusion in a case seeking access to OLC documents on targeted killings; that
court similarly cited statements by executive-branch officials in concluding that the executive branch
had waived its right to claim that the documents at issue were exempt from disclosure. 52
Third, there is strong evidence, detailed in the Mueller Report, that the exchanges between the
President and Don McGahn contain evidence of misconduct 53—something both the courts and the
executive-branch itself have suggested is an impermissible use of the privilege.
CONCLUSION
A strong executive privilege and strong congressional oversight authority are both important
principles. For decades, it has been possible to give expression to both.
The sequence of events set forth in the House Committee Report and related letters suggests that
the conduct of the WH poses risks to both: first, it threatens Congress’s ability to conduct
meaningful investigation and oversight; second, if the White House continues on this path and a
court ultimately renders a decision on the dispute, these events could result in judicial curtailing of
the privilege—ultimately weakening the executive branch’s ability to protect certain legitimate
categories of information. At the same time, Congress has an independent obligation to continue to
participate in the accommodations process, including by continuing to narrow the requests it has
issued.
Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter (May 11, 2019, 3:39 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1127342552745762816.
51 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. C.I.A., 710 F.3d 422, 429 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“The President of the United States has
himself publicly acknowledged that the United States uses drone strikes against al Qaeda.”).
52 N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 756 F.3d 100, 114, 116 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing “the numerous statements of
senior Government officials discussing the lawfulness of targeted killing of suspected terrorists, which the [district
[c]ourt characterized as ‘an extensive public relations campaign to convince the public that [the Administration’s]
conclusions . . . are correct”’ in concluding that “waiver of secrecy and privilege . . . has occurred”). For more on these
disputes, see Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L. REV. 71, 113 (2017).
53 II SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN
THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 80-90 (2019), https://gamescdn.washingtonpost.com/notes/prod/default/documents/f5fe536c-81bb-45be-86e5-a9fee9794664/note/a8d336efe98d-4a08-987d-b4c154b22700.pdf.
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